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We review demographic trends and research on families in the United States, with a special 
focus on the last decade. We consider several topics: (1) marriage and remarriage; (2) divorce; 
(3) cohabitation; (4) fertility; (5) same-gender unions; (6) immigrant families; and (7) children’s 
living arrangements. Throughout, we review both overall trends and patterns as well as those by 
social class and race-ethnicity. We discuss major strands of recent research, emphasizing 
emerging themes and promising directions. We close with a summary of central patterns and 
trends. We conclude that recent trends are not as uniform as they tended to be in earlier decades, 
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We say the home is in transition. So it is. It is moving away from what 
it was toward something that it is to be….it is not an institution usually 
at an equilibrium….It is always on the move….The home problem, 
therefore, is not one that we can finally solve. (Groves, 1925: pp. 228-
229) 
 
A family life educator born in 1877, Ernest Groves observed that the family as an institution was 
in transition and never static, words that are just as apt then as they are today. Sixty-five years 
later, family demographer Larry Bumpass asked “What’s Happening to the Family?” 
(Bumpass,1990).  The general public, researchers, and the media remain keenly interested in this 
question. Reporting results from a new survey at that time, the 1987-88 National Survey of 
Families and Households, Bumpass discussed shifts in family life. He spoke of the rise in 




divorce, the growth of cohabitation, and increases in non-marital childbearing. Twenty years 
after Bumpass in a 2010 review of family demographic trends in the U.S., Andrew Cherlin 
(2010) concluded that we are experiencing a growing disconnect between families and 
households. That is, given trends in cohabitation, divorce, repartnering and nonmarital 
childbearing, families have become less likely to reside in the same household. The most obvious 
example is that many fathers and children live apart. Despite a rapidly changing social landscape 
in the past decade, particularly with respect to the aftermath of the Great Recession, these themes 
have remained central to the study of the family.  
There are at least two types of studies in the field of family demography. One is careful 
tracking and measurement of families at either a given time point or trends over time. This 
includes the documentation of family structure, family transitions such as marriage, marital 
dissolution, and childbearing, and socioeconomic characteristics of families (e.g., income and 
education levels). This documentation motive is important, providing solid knowledge on 
changes in the family landscape. The second is a focus on the social, cultural, and economic 
correlates, precursors, and consequences of family structure and transitions. Although a large 
portion of this review is geared towards documentation of recent changes in families, we also 
incorporate recent work focused on describing and understanding the precursors and 
consequences of family structure and transitions.  
Conceptually, a subtheme of our review draws on the intersections between family 
patterns and inequality. The “diverging destinies” framework, articulated by McLanahan (2004), 




indicates that families are increasingly dissimilar across social class lines, often proxied by 
educational attainment Throughout our review, we also use terms such as social class, economic 
advantage, and so on. The economically advantaged experience more stable family forms such as 
marriage while the less privileged undergo more family instability. We broaden the diverging 
destinies framework to also consider family variation by race and ethnicity, another aspect of 
inequality and a topic of longstanding interest and importance in family research.  
 Our review is organized around trends and patterns in basic family demographic 
measures and events: marriage and remarriage, divorce, cohabitation, fertility, same-gender 
unions, immigrant families, and children’s living arrangements. Although fifty years ago 
research in family demography often fit neatly into one of these categories, a hallmark of more 
recent research is that it tends to crosscut categories (e.g., the implications of changes in 
marriage for children’s living arrangements, the dissolution of same-gender marital and 
cohabiting unions), making the placement of recent research into categories not clear cut. 
Because of the broad scope of this review, we largely restrict ourselves to the United States. 
Given the varying nature of each topic not all sections adhere to an identical outline, but are 
organized roughly as follows. We begin with a discussion of trends and basic patterns, next 
turning to variation in trends and patterns by social class and race-ethnicity. We also highlight  
major research themes and explanations for changes in families, with a special focus on recent 
research and new directions. 




We aim to make this review accessible to a variety of audiences. One audience consists 
of  scholars interested in families (or in one or more of our focal areas) who seek a summary of 
recent trends and research. We also hope this review is helpful to another audience: those 
wanting a succinct grounding in basic trends and research findings to inform qualitative 
scholarship. 
 
MARRIAGE AND REMARRIAGE 
 
Marriage is highly regarded and a goal for most men and women in the United States. The vast 
majority of young people see marriage in their futures, and this has remained virtually 
unchanged for the past several decades. Among high school seniors in 1976, 74% expected to 
marry in the future. In 2014, 79% reported that they expected to marry at some point  (Anderson, 
2016).   
Despite high levels of aspirations for marriage, there are trends signaling a retreat from 
marriage. Figure 1 shows that the percentage of adults living with a spouse has been falling 
steadily for decades. In 1967, 70% of adults were living with a spouse compared with just 51% 
in 2018 and declines over the past decade matched those in the 1990s and 2000s (U.S. Census 
Bureau, 2018a).  
[Figure 1 about here.] 




Part of the decline in the percentage of married adults is due to large increases in age at 
first marriage. As shown in Figure 1, men and women are entering first marriages substantially 
later in life. Even the last decade has seen considerable change. In 2010, the median age at 
marriage was 28.2 for men and 26.1 for women.  Just a few years later, in 2018, the analogous 
figures were 29.8 for men and 27.8 for women (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018b: Table MS-2). These 
numbers are historically unprecedented, at least since solid data have been collected that allow 
for estimates. Although some of the decline in the percentage of adults living with a spouse is 
due to delays in marriage, there have also been declines in the percent who ever marry. Estimates 
using data from 1988 suggest that 87% of women married at some point in their lives compared 
with 84% in 2000-2005 and 80% in 2005-2010 (Schoen, 2016).  
Population-level marriage trends obscure substantial differences by race and ethnicity and 
by education. One important research emphasis over the last few decades has been a growing 
Black-White gap in marriage in which African Americans have lower marriage rates than Whites 
(Lichter, McLaughlin, Kephart, & Landry, 1992; Raley, Sweeney, & Wondra, 2015; Wilson, 
1987). In 1970, among 40-44 year-old women, 95% of White women had married as had 92% of 
African-American women. In contrast, data from 2008-2012 indicate that fewer than two-thirds 
of 40-44 year-old African-American women had ever married compared to 88% of White 
women (Raley et al., 2015). More generally, race-ethnic differences in the  percentage of women 
who have ever married have grown. For example, Hispanic, American Indian/Native Alaskan, 
and African-American women all have increasingly different percentages of women marrying 




compared to White and Asian/Pacific Islander women and compared to one another (Raley et al., 
2015).  
Trends in the proportion of women ever marrying by education align with McLanahan’s 
(2004) observation that the economically advantaged are increasingly likely to experience stable 
family forms such as marriage relative to the less advantaged. Considering educational alone, in 
2016, 27% of women without a high school education were currently married compared to 
nearly 60% of those with a college degree or more. Women with high school degrees or some 
college fell in between, with 45% currently married (Allred, 2018). Among White women, 
college graduates were once less likely to have married than women with less education, but this 
gap gradually closed since 1960 due to increases in the percentage of White college graduate 
women marrying. Black college graduate women have also become more likely to ever marry 
relative to their less educated counterparts (Isen & Stevenson, 2011).   
Overall, trends by race-ethnicity and education since the 2000s represent a continuation 
of trends begun decades ago rather than a distinct new period of change (Isen & Stevenson, 
2011; Raley et al., 2015). Demographers and other social scientists in both the past decade, as 
well as in prior ones, have emphasized changes in the economy as a major reason for declines in 
marriage (Autor, Dorn, & Hanson, 2018; Cherlin, 2014; Cherlin, Ribar, & Yuasutake, 2016; 
Schneider, Harknett, & Stimpson, 2019). People appear to tie marriage “readiness” to having a 
comfortable income, little to no debt, and a secure job. That is, marriage has come to be seen as a 
luxury good, a step to be taken after one has achieved a comfortable level of economic stability 




(Addo, 2014; Cherlin, 2004; Gibson-Davis, Gassman-Pines, & Lehrman, 2018; Huang et al., 
2011; Smock, Manning, & Porter, 2005). Those markers of economic stability have become less 
available to those without college degrees as the number of well-paid, skilled manufacturing jobs 
has declined. Scores of studies have shown that the least educated, typically those with the worst 
economic prospects, are less likely to marry than the most educated (e.g., Addo, 2014; Gibson-
Davis et al., 2018; Ishizuka, 2018; Kuo & Raley, 2016; Lundberg, Pollak, & Stearns, 2016; 
Oppenheimer, 2003; Schneider et al., 2019; Smock & Manning, 1997; Smock, Manning, & 
Porter, 2005; Xie, Raymo, Goyette, & Thornton, 2003). In addition to economic factors, 
marriage market availability and the increase in mass incarceration have also been leading 
explanations for trends and variation in marriage patterns (e.g., Charles & Luoh, 2010; Cohen & 
Pepin, 2018; Lichter et al., 1992; Raley et al., 2015; Schneider et al., 2019; Wilson, 1987; but see 
Lopoo & Western, 2005).  
Given the relationship between economic wellbeing and marriage, one might have 
expected the Great Recession (which officially began in 2007 and ended in 2009 although 
unemployment rates did not reach pre-recession levels until 2015) to have reduced marriage 
(Schneider, 2017). However, marriage rates continued their previous downward trajectory over 
this period with little evidence of perturbation; that is, marriage rates declined at the same rate 
they had been before the recession when we would have expected the recession to lead to a 
steeper decline (Cherlin, Cumberworth, Morgan, & Wimer, 2013; Morgan, Cumberworth, & 
Wimer, 2011). Research using state-level variation in the severity of the recession also finds little 




evidence of a recession effect, with the possible exception of small negative effects on the 
likelihood that women of low socioeconomic status marry (Morgan et al., 2011; Schneider & 
Hastings, 2015). One possible reason for the recession’s lack of apparent effect is that it is not 
only economics that matter for marriage. A key explanatory framework used to understand 
temporal changes in family patterns is the second demographic transition (SDT). SDT 
emphasizes that ideational factors (e.g., norms, attitudes), alongside economic changes, are vital 
for understanding why family life is decreasingly centered around marriage and supportive of 
other family forms (Lesthaeghe, 2014; Lesthaeghe & Neidert, 2006; Lesthaeghe & van de Kaa, 
1986).  
The future may well be characterized by a continued retreat from marriage. Consider the 
percentage marrying by age 40 for Generation X (i.e., those born between 1966 and 1972) 
(Martin, Astone, & Peters, 2014). For Generation X women, 82% married by age 40. Martin and 
colleagues projected that the percent married will decrease to 75% and 70% for early (b. 1980) 
and late (b. 1990) Millennials, respectively. The study also projects growing divergence by 
education in the percentage who marry with slow but steady declines in marriage for men and 
women with college degrees and faster declines for those without college degrees. As the authors 
state: “The singles are coming” (Martin et al., 2014, p. 4).  
Although the percentage of men and women currently and ever married has declined, 
particularly among the less advantaged, remarriage is common because divorce remains 
common. About 34% of ever-married men aged 60-69 in 2008-2012 had had two or more 




marriages as had 30% of ever-married women (Lewis & Kreider, 2015). There is also evidence 
of racial-ethnic and educational variation. McNamee and Raley (2011) estimate the number of 
years it takes for 25% of women in various subgroups to remarry using data from the mid-2000s. 
Black and Latina (both native- and foreign-born) women take longer to remarry than White 
women. By 3.8 years post separation, 25% of White women have remarried. For both native- and 
foreign-born Latinas, the comparable number is slightly more than 5 years. For Black women, 
the data do not allow for an estimate: one quarter is never reached over the observation period. 
Remarriage rates are highest for those with some college or a bachelor’s degree, and least 
common for high school dropouts (Payne, 2018).  
There also appears to be a retreat from remarriage. Between 1950 and 2017, remarriage 
rates declined by more than one half (Schweizer, 2019). Importantly, this decline is not 
concentrated in the more distant past; the trend has continued into recent years (Schweizer, 2019; 
see also Payne, 2018; McNamee & Raley, 2011; Sweeney, 2010). It holds for diverse groups 
such as Asian, Hispanic, White, Black, and native- and foreign-born men and women. To some 
extent, post-divorce cohabitation may be replacing remarriage. Entrance into cohabiting unions 
after divorce happens more much more quickly than entrance into remarriage (McNamee & 
Raley, 2011). Within 1.7 to 2.8 years after divorce for all racial-ethnic-nativity subgroups, 25% 
have entered a cohabiting union. This compares to 2.8 to 5.2 years for remarriage. Taken 
together, these findings are suggestive of a retreat from remarriage with cohabitation offsetting 
some of this decline (Brown & Wright, 2017). An important implication of both remarriage and 




postdivorce cohabitation is that they create stepfamilies; most individuals who remarry or enter a 




As Figure 2 shows, divorce rates increased slowly in the United States (with the exception of 
short period fluctuations) from the late 1800s through the early 1960s before surging upwards 
beginning in the 1960s. Since the late 1970s, divorce rates—the number of divorces per 1,000 
married women—have remained high. Estimates of the lifetime percentage of marriages that 
dissolve—which includes both separation and divorce—from 1980 indicate that 44% of 
marriages would dissolve compared with 43-46% in 2005-2010 (Schoen, 2016; Schoen & 
Standish, 2001). Vital statistics data from state administrative records suggest that divorce rates 
declined from the late 1970s through the mid-1990s, but the deteriorating quality of these data 
may partially account for this (Kennedy & Ruggles, 2014). However, data from the American 
Community Survey (ACS), an in-depth U.S. Census Bureau survey with data on divorce since 
2008, lend additional support to the argument that divorce rates have declined. Further, in the last 
decade, ACS data indicate a steeper decrease in divorce rates than in previous decades.  
[Figure 2 about here.] 
Declines in divorce among young adults are largely responsible for recent declines in 
divorce rates. The divorce rate among younger adults declined between 1990 and 2010 and has 




continued to decline since then (Cohen, 2018; Kennedy & Ruggles, 2014). One group that has 
not seen declines in divorce, but rather an increase, is older Americans, a shift coined the “grey 
divorce revolution.” Between 1990 and 2010 the divorce rate among those aged 50 and older 
more than doubled, albeit beginning from a low baseline (Brown & Lin, 2012). The grey divorce 
revolution is largely driven by Baby Boomers who were also more likely to divorce than their 
predecessors at younger ages (Brown & Lin, 2012; Brown & Wright, 2017). Cohen (2018) 
suggests the decline of divorce rates among younger adults may foreshadow lower divorce rates 
in the future. Moreover, given ever-later ages of first marriage, those who do marry young may 
be an increasingly select group of highly committed couples. In addition, the aging of the 
population implies increasing numbers of older married couples who tend to have lower 
(although increasing) divorce rates than younger married couples. Kennedy and Ruggles (2014) 
show that this compositional shift has dampened divorce trends—divorce rates would have been 
substantially higher since the 1980s if not for the aging of the married population. Thus, the 
increasing selectivity of couples into marriage and the aging of the married population are vital 
factors to consider when interpreting trends in divorce. 
Like other demographic patterns, trends in marital dissolution have diverged by 
education. This divergence began among those married in the 1980s when education differences 
in divorce existed but were substantially smaller and continued among those married into the 
early 2000s (Martin, 2006; Schwartz & Han, 2014). Recent estimates indicate stark educational 
differences in marital dissolution as measured by either separation or divorce, whichever 




occurred first. The probability of marital dissolution after twenty years of marriage in 2006-2012 
was 22% for college graduates but 51% for those with some college, 59% for high school 
graduates, and 61% for those without a high school diploma or GED (Copen, Daniels, Vespa, & 
Mosher, 2012:Table 5). The highly educated have increasingly stable marriages relative to their 
less educated counterparts in a number of other countries as well including Austria, France, 
Spain, Sweden, the Netherlands, Korea, and Taiwan (Cheng, 2016; Park & Raymo, 2013; 
Garriga & Cortina, 2017; Matysiak, Styrc, & Vignoli, 2014; Härkönen & Dronkers, 2006; de 
Graaf & Kalmijn, 2006).  
There is some indication, however, that the educational divergence in marital dissolution 
is not the same across populations—in the U.S., for instance, education differences in marital 
dissolution have not grown as quickly and are not nearly as large for Black women as for White 
women (Kim, 2012). Differences in marital dissolution between Black and White women, 
however, have increased. Before 1920, race differences in divorce were relatively small, but they 
increased substantially between the 1960s and 1990s (Bramlett & Mosher, 2002; Ruggles, 1997; 
Sweeney & Phillips, 2004; Raley et al., 2015). Estimates of the lifetime percentage of marriages 
that dissolve from the late 2000s indicate that Black women’s marriages are more likely to 
dissolve than other women’s; 73% of Black women’s first marriages are estimated to dissolve 
within twenty years compared with 46% of White women’s, 47% of Hispanic women’s, and 
31% of Asian women’s (Copen et al., 2012).  




An area that has received renewed attention over the last decade because of interest in the 
effects of the Great Recession is the link between economic cycles and divorce. Since the early 
2000s, the relationship between divorce rates and unemployment rates has been negative; that is, 
when unemployment went down, the divorce rate went up and when unemployment went up (as 
during the Great Recession), divorce rates went down (Cohen, 2014; Schaller, 2013). As is the 
case for marriage, these effects were small, and evidence suggests that on balance the recession 
may have delayed marital dissolutions rather than led people to forgo them altogether (Cherlin et 
al., 2013; Schaller, 2013). One study finds that when men become unemployed while separated 
from their wives, legal divorce tends to be delayed. Thus, the Great Recession may have delayed 
divorce among those already separated (Tumin & Qian, 2017), potentially explaining some of 
the decline in divorce rates since 2008 (Figure 2). The convention among family demographers 
is to study marital dissolution starting from the time of separation rather than relying on the date 
of a legal divorce. Those in economic straits may only divorce if remarriage is on the horizon. 
Whether better economic times will result in an uptick in divorce or whether these declines are 
part of a longer-term trend driven by declines in divorce among younger adults and increased 








The U.S. is past the time when being unmarried meant being “single.” People are waiting longer 
to marry and if they marry at all, they are not delaying living with an intimate partner 
(Kuperberg, 2014; Lamidi & Manning, 2016). The proportion of adults living with a different-
gender unmarried partner has increased steadily since cohabitation measurement began in the 
1960s, with a speed-up in the trend beginning in the late 1970s (Smock, 2000; U.S. Census 
Bureau 2018a). Thus, the central story of different-gender cohabitation over the past decade is 
that the prominence of living together outside of marriage continues to increase.  
There are other ways to grasp the cohabitation trend. It is often demonstrated by 
examining the percentage of people who report having ever cohabited. Questions asking whether 
one has ever cohabited are preferable to describe people’s cohabitation experience. Because 
cohabitation tends to be a short-term state, with marriage or dissolution occurring within a few 
years, snapshot measures of current cohabitation status underestimate the prevalence of 
cohabitation in people’s lives. Among women aged 25-29, 49% had ever cohabited in 1995, 
rising to a striking 73% in 2011-13. While those with college educations are somewhat less 
likely to have cohabited, the majority of women in all education groups had cohabited by their 
late mid-to-late 20s (Lamidi & Manning, 2016). 
Cohabitation is not solely the province of the young. Among older adults, defined as 
those 50 and up, cohabitation has also increased. In 2000 there were approximately 1.2 million 
men and women age 50 and up in cohabiting relationships (Brown, Bulanda, & Lee, 2005).  By 
2014, that number was 3.2 million (Hemez & Brown, 2016). We do not know the percentage of 




older adults who have ever cohabited. To date, data sources do not provide the requisite 
information to calculate that figure.  
Another way researchers gauge the increasing prominence of cohabitation is via the 
proportion of marriages that begin as cohabiting relationships. Among women who first married 
between 1980 and 1984, two-fifths lived with their spouses first. Among those marrying between 
2010 and 2014, a far higher 70% lived with their spouses beforehand. Figure 3 shows that, 
consistent with other demographic patterns, there is an educational divide, with more educated 
women more likely to forgo premarital cohabitation than less educated women. Among those 
marrying between 2010 and 2014, 85% of those without a high school degree lived with their 
spouse before marriage compared to 63% of those with at least a bachelor’s degree (Hemez & 
Manning, 2017). Figure 3 also shows that the education gradient in cohabitation has grown 
across cohorts. Racial-ethnic differences in the percentage of adults who cohabit prior to 
marriage are small: the numbers are 70%, 77%, and 73% for non-Hispanic Whites, non-Hispanic 
Blacks, and Hispanics. The major point is that most people who marry are cohabiting first.  
[Figure 3 about here.] 
Recent research has examined social class differences in other aspects of cohabitation. 
Sassler, Michelmore, and Qian (2018), for example, investigate the pace of entry into 
cohabitation. Women from more advantaged backgrounds are not only less likely to cohabit, but 
among those that do, the pace of entry into coresidence is slower than for less advantaged 
women. In addition, college educated women who had cohabited were more likely to transition 




into marriage than less advantaged women (Sassler et al., 2018; see also Sassler & Miller, 2017). 
There is also evidence of educational divergence in the role of cohabitation in people’s lives in 
Canada. Wright (2018) found that Canadians without a bachelor’s degree are more likely to have 
a child within cohabitation and that marriage chances for the less educated have sharply 
decreased.  
 While most cohabiting couples marry or dissolve their relationships fairly quickly, 
within two to three years, recent studies suggest a trend toward lower chances of marriage and 
higher levels of dissolution. Mernitz (2018) studied two cohorts of cohabitors. The later cohort 
represents those born between 1980 and 1984, while the earlier one consists of those born 
between 1957 and 1964. Only 32% of the more recent cohort married within five years of the 
start of cohabitation compared to 41% of the earlier cohort. There is also a slight cohort 
differential in terms of breaking up: 52% of the more recent cohort broke up within five years of 
living together compared to 49% of the earlier cohort (see also Guzzo, 2014; Kuo & Raley, 
2016; Lamidi, Manning, & Brown, 2019). 
Thus, it appears that cohabitation has become less a “stepping stone” to marriage and this 
is especially so for those who are not economically advantaged. This is consistent with the 
numerous studies across the past two decades or so showing that the well-off are more likely to 
transition from cohabitation to marriage than those in less salutary economic situations (e.g., 
Smock & Manning,1997; Ishizuka, 2018; Xie et al., 2003). In fact, serial cohabitation – 




cohabiting more than once – has been rising and is more prevalent among the less educated 
(Eickmeyer & Manning, 2018; Lichter & Qian, 2008; Lichter, Turner & Sassler, 2010). 
Another focus of recent research is childbearing and childrearing within cohabiting 
unions. Studies suggests a continued “decoupling” of marriage and childbearing as cohabitation 
becomes an increasingly normative context for having children. Roughly 40% of nonmarital 
births were to cohabiting couples in 2010-2014. In fact, the increase in nonmarital births is due to 
the increase in births to cohabiting couples and not to increases in non-union childbearing 
(Lamidi, 2016; Wu, 2017). The share of all births to cohabiting mothers has grown from just 6% 
in 1980-1984 to 26% in 2010-2014. The increase cuts across all racial and ethnic groups as well 
as education levels, although highly educated women remain unlikely to have nonmarital births. 
At the same time, the share of births to single, non-cohabiting women has been stable over the 
last few decades. It has hovered around 15-18% between the early 1980s and the early 2010s. In 
2010-14, the percentage was 15% (Wu, 2017).  
 A new development is emerging evidence from several studies that cohabitation appears 
to no longer decrease marital stability. Two decades ago, the vast majority of studies showed a 
positive correlation between premarital cohabitation and marital dissolution (Smock, 2000). 
Those who cohabited before marriage faced higher risks of divorce. The purported mechanisms 
were that cohabitors were a select group of the population with more liberal attitudes, including 
attitudes towards divorce. Another explanation was that there is something about the experience 
of cohabitation itself that leads people to learn that intimate family relationships are not solely 




defined by marriage. In the early 2000s, studies emerged showing that the negative cohabitation 
effect did not apply to all racial and ethnic subgroups. Phillips and Sweeney (2005), for example, 
found that non-Hispanic White women who cohabited were more likely to experience divorce 
but that this was not so for non-Hispanic Black or Mexican-American women.  
In the last decade, several articles were published suggesting that the “cohabitation 
effect” had by and large disappeared and that those who cohabit before marriage are no longer 
more vulnerable to divorce than others (Copen et al., 2012; Kuperberg, 2014; Manning & Cohen, 
2012; Musick & Michelmore, 2015). Reinhold (2010), for example, even finds that cohabitation 
can stabilize remarriages. A possible explanation for these newer findings is that as cohabitation 
now has a normative presence, it no longer serves as a marker of more or less stable marriages. 
Research on other countries similarly suggests that as cohabitation becomes more normative, the 
effects of premarital cohabitation on the risk of divorce risk diminish (Liefbroer & Dourleijn, 
2006). Although the weight of evidence is in the direction of little or no association between 
premarital cohabitation and divorce, one recently published article finds that the positive 
association between premarital cohabitation and marital dissolution persists (Rosenfeld & 








Figure 4 shows that fertility rates in the United States declined precipitously after the Baby 
Boom (i.e., 1947-1964) through the early 1970s and have been relatively stable since then. 
Fertility rates increased slightly between the mid-1990s and 2007 but have since fallen to record 
lows (Hamilton, Martin, Osterman, Driscoll, & Rossen, 2019). In 2018, the fertility rate was 59.0 
births per 1,000 women age 15-44 compared with 69.3 in 2007 (Hamilton et al., 2019; Martin, 
Hamilton, Osterman, Driscoll, & Mathews, 2017). Low points from previous eras were higher 
than current levels. For example, Figure 4 shows that fertility rates in the midst of the Great 
Depression were higher than they were in 2018. Much of the decline in fertility since 2007 is due 
to declines in births among young women. Births to women age 40 and over increased, but not 
enough to counteract the decline among women in their teens and twenties. Teen births have 
been dropping especially rapidly and are at historic lows (Hamilton et al., 2019). Since 2007, 
fertility rates have also declined across a broad array of race-ethnic groups including for White, 
Black, American Indian and Alaska Native, and Asian and Pacific Islander women, and declines 
were especially large for Hispanic women (Martin et al., 2017). 
[Figure 4 about here.] 
Despite these declines, the United States still has higher total fertility rates than most 
European countries, although it has not had above replacement-level fertility (above 2.1) since 
2007 and was 1.8 births per woman on average as of 2017 (World Bank, 2019). In 2017, the 
number of births per woman in the United States was slightly lower than in Sweden, Ireland, and 
France among a few other OECD countries, but higher than in Belgium, Norway, and Germany, 




for example. An active area of research over the last decade investigates reasons for cross-
national variation in fertility rates, often citing the ease or difficulty with which women combine 
work and family responsibilities (e.g., Esping-Andersen & Billari, 2015; McDonald, 2013). 
 The decline in fertility since 2007 is small relative to larger historical shifts but has 
inspired an active literature on the whether the decline might be due to the Great Recession. The 
consensus is that the Great Recession did reduce fertility somewhat among younger women (see 
Schneider, 2017; Sobotka, Skirbekk, & Philipov, 2011 for reviews), but there is not consensus 
about whether the decline represents a temporary postponement or whether the total number of 
children women eventually have will be negatively affected by the recession (Astone, Martin, & 
Peters, 2015; Cherlin et al., 2013; Currie & Schwandt, 2014; Seltzer, 2019). Because the 
recession affected the fertility of younger rather than older women, there is still time for 
completed fertility rates to rebound (Cherlin et al., 2013). In addition, a key component in the 
decline in fertility was a large drop in fertility among Hispanic immigrants. Because the 
recession was associated with considerable reductions in Hispanic immigration--in particular, 
migration from Mexico (Villarreal, 2014)--the Hispanic immigrant population has aged over this 
period. Thus, rather than a direct response to economic hardship among those already in the U.S., 
the shifting composition of the immigrant population away from peak childbearing years may be 
responsible for a substantial portion of the decline in Hispanic immigrant fertility (Cherlin et al., 
2013; Parrado, 2011). Despite an official end to the recession in 2009 and increased 
employment, fertility has continued to decline. Longer-term structural changes, especially the 




decline of manufacturing and construction, also depress fertility; thus fertility rates may be 
unlikely to rebound soon (Seltzer, 2019). 
  Unlike notable divergence by education in marriage and divorce patterns, trends in 
fertility differentials by education are less apparent. Women with more education have long had 
fewer children on average than those with less education, and these differentials have remained 
relatively stable (Isen & Stevenson, 2011; Martinez, Daniels, & Febo-Vazquez, 2018). Yet there 
are indications that some change has occurred. Although remaining lower than among those with 
less education, fertility rates among college educated women (in particular, those with advanced 
degrees) have increased (Hayford, 2013; Hazan & Zoabi, 2015; Livingston, 2015; Shang & 
Weinberg, 2013; Vere, 2007). Some research has pointed to the greater ability of highly educated 
women to outsource especially as the relative price of childcare for highly educated women has 
fallen whereas it has increased the less educated (Hazan & Zoabi, 2015). In addition, among 
highly educated women, the availability of child care has increased and their spouses participate 
more in childcare (Antecol, 2015; Shang & Weinberg, 2013). The timing of women’s fertility by 
education has also diverged with college graduates delaying childbirth more than less educated 
women (McLanahan, 2004). In recent cohorts, women with at most a high school degree have 
often completed childbearing by their late 20s, an age at which college graduates are just 
beginning to have children (Cherlin, Talbert, & Yasutake, 2014). 
A large proportion of births occur outside marriage. After increasing steadily since the 
1960s, the percentage of births to unmarried women has been relatively stable since 2008, with 




40% of all births to unmarried women in 2016 (Child Trends, 2018). Births to unmarried 
mothers are far more common among mothers with less education. In 2009-2013, the proportion 
of births to unmarried mothers with less than a high school degree was 68% compared with 11% 
for college educated mothers (Manning et al., 2015). Whereas education differences in 
nonmarital and unintended fertility have clearly increased over time (England, Shafer, & Wu, 
2012; Hayford & Guzzo, 2016), differences in nonmarital fertility between White and Black 
women have shrunk somewhat because non-marital births have increased more for White women 
than for Black women. Non-marital births grew for White women from 21% in 1995 to 29% in 
2016 whereas they were 70% for Black women in both 1995 and 2016 (after fluctuating 
somewhat in the intervening years) (Child Trends, 2018). At the same time, differences between 
White and Hispanic women have increased because non-marital births increased faster for 
Hispanic women (42% in 1995 to 53% in 2016) than White women (Child Trends, 2018; 
Manning, Brown, & Stykes, 2014). Differences in marital fertility rates and timing have also 
declined between Black and White women (Hayford, Guzzo, & Smock, 2014) as have total 
fertility rates for White, Black, and Hispanic women (Sweeney & Raley, 2014).  
The rise of nonmarital childbearing and family instability is also linked to an increase in 
“multiple-partner” fertility (MPF), which is defined as having children with more than one 
partner. MPF existed in the past—6% of White married couples experienced MPF in 1955 (Zobl 
& Smock, 2015)—but it has increased markedly and is now less associated with marital fertility 
within stepfamilies and more associated with nonmarital fertility (Stykes & Guzzo, 2019). 




Among parents, recent estimates of MPF generally fall in the 14% to 25% range depending on 
the data source and age restrictions (Guzzo, 2014; Monte, 2019; Scott, Peterson, Ikramullah, & 
Manlove, 2013; Stykes & Guzzo, 2019). But among unmarried parents, estimates are 
substantially higher (Cancian, Meyer, & Cook, 2011; Fomby & Osborne, 2017; Guzzo, 2014). 
Monte (2019) provides national prevalence estimates and reports that in cohabiting families with 
children, MPF is 43.6%. MPF is also more common among socioeconomically disadvantaged 
men and women, those who had their first births at young ages, and in populations and contexts 
where union dissolution rates are high (Carlson & Furstenberg, 2006; Monte, 2019; Thomson, 
Lappegard, Carlson, Evans, & Gray, 2014). There is also evidence that MPF has increased in the 
recent past and will continue to increase into the future given that younger cohorts of men and 




On June 26, 2015, in a landmark case the Supreme Court ruled in favor of marriage equality 
(Obergefell v. Hodges, 2015). Before that time, several states allowed same-gender couples to 
marry, but the 2015 decision made same-gender marriage legal in all states. Same-gender 
marriage increased after Obergefell v. Hodges but pinning down the effect of the decision is 
methodologically difficult. This stems from the fact that same-gender marriage was available in 
several states and the District of Columbia prior to Obergefell v. Hodges, and that different data 




sources and assumptions affect estimates. In 2016, there were 486,994 married same-gender 
couples, which were relatively evenly split between female and male couples (roughly 251,000 
and 235,000, respectively) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2016). By 2017, estimates based on nationally 
representative data from a Gallup Poll in combination with Census data indicate that the total 
number of married same-gender couples had increased to 547,000 (Romero, 2017). Some 
scholars would argue that this is too low; a study also based on Gallup survey data suggested that 
even in 2015 there were as many as 780,000 same-gender married couples (Gates & Newport, 
2015). Focusing only on married same-gender couples also underestimates the number of 
coresidential same-gender couples given that, as is true for different-gender couples, many same-
gender couples are cohabiting. In 2017, there were roughly 380,000 same-gender cohabiting 
couple households. Like married same-gender households, these are fairly evenly split between 
female and male couple households (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017a).    
Same-gender couples tend to be more socioeconomically advantaged on a number of 
dimensions than different-gender couples. For example, married same-gender couples have 
higher levels of schooling than their different-gender counterparts. In 34% of these same-gender 
married couples, both spouses have a college degree or more; for different-gender married 
couples, both spouses have at least a college degree in only one-quarter of cases. Married same-
gender couples are also more likely to have both partners employed (57% vs. 49%), are 
somewhat more likely to self-identify as White (84% vs. 81%) and less likely to self-identify as 
Black, Asian, or Hispanic, and have higher median household incomes. In 2017, median 




household income for different-gender married couples was $88,683 versus $98,889 for same-
gender married couples. Cohabiting same-gender couples are also more likely to be college 
graduates, be employed, self-identify as White, and have higher median incomes than different-
gender cohabitors (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017a).  
Notably, there is a substantial gender disparity in the incomes of same-gender couples. In 
2017, annual income for female married couples was roughly $90,000 compared to a 
substantially higher $111,000 for male married couples (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017a). Fisher, 
Gee, & Looney (2018) used federal tax records on annual income in 2015 and find similar 
results: female married couples had median adjusted gross incomes of $90,531 compared with 
$109,788 for male married couples and $79,966 for different-gender married couples. This 
gender disparity among same-gender married couples does not appear to be accounted for by 
employment or by education. For the two groups, the percent in which both spouses are 
employed is almost identical and there is only a trivial difference in educational attainment: in 
35.7% of male married households and 33.5% of female married households both spouses have 
at least a bachelor’s degree. The male income advantage among same-gender couples also holds 
among same-gender cohabiting couples (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017a ). 
Same-gender couples, married or unmarried, are less likely to be raising children than 
different-gender couples. Only 19% of married and 13% of unmarried same-gender couples are 
raising children compared to 39% of married and 38% of unmarried different-gender couples  
(U.S. Census Bureau, 2017a). In addition, childrearing is much more common among female 




than male couples. More than twice as many female couples have children (24%) than their male 
counterparts (9%) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017a; see also Gates, 2015). Childrearing is also more 
common among African-American, Latino, and Native American/Alaskan than among White 
same-gender couples. For example, 40% of African-American same-gender couples have 
children under 18 in the home compared to 16% of White same-gender couples (Gates, 2012).  
 Compared to different-gender couples, the education gradient in parenthood for same-
gender couples is much larger. In 2009, unmarried same-gender couples with a high school 
diploma were somewhat less likely than comparably educated different-gender couples to have 
children in the home (32% vs. 41%), but same-gender couples with college degrees were 
dramatically less likely to have children in the home (10% vs. 47%) (Gates, 2012: Figure 3). 
Thus, same-gender couples with children in the home tend to have less education, lower median 
incomes, and higher poverty rates than different-gender parents despite the fact that same-gender 
couples as a whole have higher incomes and education than different-gender couples (Albelda, 
Badgett, Schneebaum, & Gates, 2013; Fisher et al., 2018; Gates, 2012; Gates, 2015; Rosenfeld, 
2010). When differences in couples’ education and other characteristics predictive of poverty are 
controlled, one study using data from 2010-2013 found that children in female couple 
households have similar rates of poverty as their counterparts in different-gender couple 
households (Brown, Manning, &  Payne, 2016); but others found that even after controlling for 
similar characteristics, female-couple households were more likely to be poor (Albelda et al., 
2013; Schneebaum & Badgett, 2019). Data that include information on sexual orientation show 




that controlling for education, demographic, marital status, and health measures, lesbians and gay 
men are not more likely to be poor than heterosexuals, but bisexual women and men are 
statistically significantly more likely to be poor (Badgett, 2018).  
 There are also indications of a decline in parenthood among same-gender couples since 
2006, stemming from a decrease in births from prior different-gender relationships; this mirrors 
trends in the general population (see Figure 4). Although the majority of children living with 
same-gender parents are biological or step-children of one of the partners, rates of adoption and 
fostering are much higher among same- than different-gender couples (Gates, 2012, 2015). Yet 
the decline in births from prior relationships outpaced increases in adoption, fostering, and 
reproductive technologies, leading to an overall decline in parenthood among same-gender 
couples since the mid-2000s (Gates, 2015). 
Relationship dissolution patterns among same-gender couples have been actively studied 
over the past decade. Perhaps the most important observation is that to date, there are no studies 
that directly compare dissolution rates among legally married same-gender and different-gender 
couples in the United States. A fairly consistent finding is that same-gender couples, (including 
both cohabitors and married couples), and in particular, female couples, have higher dissolution 
rates than different-gender couples (e.g., Joyner, Manning, & Bogle, 2017; Kolk & Andersson, 
2018; Lau, 2012; Wiik, Seierstad, & Noack, 2014). One reason is that despite the current legality 
of same-gender marriage, same-gender couples remain less likely than different-gender couples 
to be married and marriage is a more stable relationship type than cohabitation or dating 




(Joyneret al., 2017; Rosenfeld, 2014). Tracking trends in dissolution patterns is an important area 




In 2017, 44.4 million people in the United States were immigrants, often termed “foreign born”, 
representing 13.6% of the U.S. population (Radford, 2019). Immigration to the United States 
surged in the 1980s through the early 2000s along with the share of the population that is foreign 
born (Office of Immigration Statistics, 2017: Table 1; Radford & Noe-Bustamante, 2019). Since 
the Great Recession, legal immigration has leveled off and the size of the undocumented 
immigrant population has remained relatively constant or declined somewhat, depending on the 
estimate (Massey, 2012; Office of Immigration Statistics, 2017: Table 1; 2018: Figure 1; 
Radford & Noe-Bustamante, 2019).  
Despite the leveling of immigration into the United States, the share of the population 
that is foreign born has grown since the 1970s and reached 14% in 2017 (compared with a high 
of almost 15% in 1890) (Radford, 2019). Over this period, the composition of immigrant flows 
have changed. In the early 2000s, most immigrants arriving in the United States were from the 
Americas, Mexico in particular, but immigration from Mexico has declined since the Great 
Recession and immigration from Asia has increased (Massey, 2012; Passel, Cohn, & Gonzalez-
Barrera, 2012; Radford & Noe-Bustamante, 2019; Villarreal, 2014). As of 2017, the largest 




groups of immigrants are from South and East Asia (27%), Mexico (25%), other countries in 
Latin America (25%), and Europe or Canada (13%) (Radford & Noe-Bustamante, 2019).  
What are the basic family patterns of immigrants? First, marriage is common in this 
population. Among those at least 18 years old in 2017, nearly 61% of those born outside of the 
U.S. were currently married. This compares to 48% among those born in the U.S. (Radford & 
Noe-Bustamante, 2019). It should be noted that these figures are based on a marital status 
question so do not capture past experience, only present circumstances. Part of the reason 
marriage prevalence is higher for the foreign born is because they are younger and in prime ages 
for marriage.  
 Second, marital dissolution is not unusual. Life table estimates using data from 2006-
2010 suggest that 26% of married foreign-born Hispanics will separate (due to marital discord) 
or divorce within 10 years of marriage compared with 32% of marriages in the general 
population (Copen et al., 2012). The percentage of the foreign born currently divorced or 
separated has increased slowly over the past several decades, from 9% in 1990 to 11% in 2017 
(Radford & Noe-Bustamante, 2019). These numbers conceal a good deal of heterogeneity. For 
example, almost 20% of those from the Caribbean were separated or divorced, compared to 7% 
of those from South and East Asia (Radford & Noe-Bustamante, 2019). 
 Tougher immigration enforcement associated with deportation is also a cause of family 
separation (Amuedo-Dorantes & Arenas-Arroyo, 2019; Amuedo-Dorantes, Pozo, & Puttitanum, 
2015). For example, Amuedo-Dorantes and Arenas-Arroyo (2019) find that increases in 




immigration enforcement between 2005 and 2015 increased the likelihood that undocumented 
mothers live without their spouses by 20%and the likelihood that Hispanic U.S.-born children 
live without their parents by 19%. Family separations associated with deportation are associated 
with increased poverty, fear, stress, anxiety, and depression (Dreby, 2012, 2015;  Hagan, 
Rodríguez, & Castro, 2011; Rodríguez & Hagan, 2004;  Suárez-Orozco, Bang, & Kim, 2011). 
Non-migrant mothers that are left behind in their origin country also experience distress when 
their spouses migrate to the U.S. (Nobles, Rubalcava, & Teruel, 2015). 
Third, immigrants play a large role in fertility in the U.S. After increasing steadily for 
decades, the number of U.S. births to foreign-born mothers declined between 2007 and 2014, a 
trend that also held for births to undocumented immigrants (Livingston, 2016; Passel & Cohn, 
2016). As noted in the fertility section of this article, birth rates among immigrant women fell 
more rapidly than those for U.S.-born women in the wake of the Great Recession, thereby 
contributing to an overall decline in fertility rates. Nevertheless, births to foreign-born women 
still comprise a large portion of all births in the U.S. In 2014, 23% of U.S.-born babies had 
foreign-born mothers. Most of these births were to women born in Latin America (54%), but the 
share of births to women born in Latin America has declined since 2010 while the share of births 
to Asian mothers has increased alongside migration from Asia (Livingston, 2016). 
Recent research has also shown that births to foreign-born women are compensating for 
declining births among U.S.-born women in a number of states (including North Carolina, 
Florida, Washington, and Nebraska among others) (Livingston, 2017). A combination of low 




birth rates, population aging, and increased mortality among the non-Hispanic U.S. population 
means that Hispanic migration and fertility have been important in offsetting population decline 
in many locations. Further, because immigration to the U.S. from Mexico has declined and a 
smaller share of new immigrants are from the Americas (Radford & Noe-Bustamante, 2017) this 
means that Hispanic immigration contributes proportionately less to U.S. population growth than 
in the past, thereby increasing the relative contribution of Hispanic fertility (Johnson & Lichter, 
2013, 2016). If immigration declines in the future, the relative contribution of Hispanic fertility 
versus in-migration to U.S. population growth might increase further. But a countervailing factor 
could be the tendency for fertility to be higher among recent immigrants and lower among 
second and third generation immigrants in the U.S. (Carter, 2000; Choi, 2014; Parrado, 2011), a 
pattern also found in Europe (e.g., Dubuc, 2012; Kulu et al., 2017). 
Another area of research concerns trends and patterns of intermarriage between 
immigrants and the native-born; intermarriage has often been used to gauge the extent to which 
immigrants form intimate social ties with the native-born. Over the past decade, researchers have 
increasingly focused on differences in immigrant-native intermarriage rates by country of origin 
rather than classifying immigrants into panethnic groups (Alba & Foner, 2015; Kalmijn, 2012; 
Lichter, Qian, & Tumin, 2015; Qian, Glick, & Batson, 2012). A major finding from this research 
is that immigrants from some countries are more likely to marry across ethnic lines the longer 
they have been in the U.S. and across successive generations. Other immigrant groups, however, 




sustain much lower intermarriage rates across generations despite high education and earnings 
(Lichter et al., 2015).  
Scholars have also increasingly taken advantage of new survey data (questions included 
since 2008 in the American Community Survey) on the timing of marriage and migration. Prior 
research has generally focused on marriages occurring since immigrants’ arrival in the United 
States. Recent research, however, shows that this approach ignores substantial proportions of 
intermarriages that occur either before the immigrant spouse migrated to the United States or 
occurred in the same year of migration. In 2010-2014, 46% of immigrant women married to 
native-born U.S. citizens married prior to or in the same year as migration (Balistreri, Joyner, & 
Kao, 2017: Figure 1). These findings suggest that migration and marriage are often intertwined 
processes (Balistreri et al., 2017; Stevens, Ishizawa, & Escandell, 2012). Unlike in the 2000s 
when researchers documented declines in intermarriage between foreign-born Hispanics and 
native-born whites (Qian & Lichter, 2007), little research has examined trends in intermarriage 
between the foreign- and native-born in the current decade. Given changing migration patterns, 
this is a fruitful avenue for future research. 
 
CHILDREN’S LIVING ARRANGEMENTS 
 
Children’s living arrangements reflect the family transitions of their parents. As we have 
underscored, change continues to occur in many realms relevant to children. Parents divorce, 




have children in cohabiting relationships or on their own, and enter new marital or cohabiting 
relationships.  
Taking the long view, children’s living arrangements have changed substantially. For 
example, in 1970, 12% of all children lived in single-parent families, the vast majority of which 
were mother-only families. By 2018, 27% did so (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018c: Table CH1). A 
more specific portrait is as follows. In 2016, the proportion of all children living in a two-
biological parent married household stood at 60%. Roughly 3% lived in a two-parent biological 
cohabiting family, 9% in a step-parent family, 24% in a single-parent family, and the remainder 
in other arrangements. Of the 9% of children living in a stepfamily, approximately 55% are in 
step-parent married families and 45% are in cohabiting stepfamilies. Among the 24% of children 
living in single-parent families, the vast majority live with their mother; only 3% live in a single-
father family (Eickmeyer, 2017b, 2017c).These numbers are virtually identical to those for 2010 
indicating little change in the past decade (Eickmeyer, 2017a).  
Although only 9% of children were living in a step-parent family in 2016, stepkin are a 
more prominent feature of U.S. families than this rather low percentage suggests. The formation 
of stepfamilies in childhood also extends into individuals’ adult lives. A recent study estimates 
that 30% of U.S. households contain a tie to an adult stepchild or stepparent (e.g., adults have a 
stepchild in the household or have a stepparent in another household) (Wiemers, Seltzer, 
Schoeni, Hotz, & Bianchi, 2019). The prevalence of stepkin ties is substantially higher among 




younger households (i.e., head of household is less than 55 years old) than older households 
(37% versus 19%), consistent with the trends covered in this review.  
 Consistent with the growing diversity of family forms, children are also increasingly 
likely to live with a grandparent. In 1970, the share was 3.2%, rising to 8% in 2015. While these 
percentages are small, almost 30% of all children in the U.S. have coresided with a grandparent 
at some point during childhood (Amorim, Dunifon, & Pilkauskas, 2017). While the majority of 
children living with a grandparent also live with their parent(s) (i.e., a three-generation 
household), 25% live with their grandparent without a parent in the household. This latter 
configuration is termed a “skipped-generation” household.  
There is substantial variation along the lines of social class and race-ethnicity. The 
general upshot is that economics and family structure play out in a way that disadvantages 
children with less privileged backgrounds and underrepresented minorities. Consider children in 
two biological-parent families; this includes both married and cohabiting couple families. 
Among those in married families, 53% have a parent with at least a college degree, compared to 
15% of children in biological cohabiting families (Eickmeyer, 2017a). Data collected in 2017 are 
also indicative of a social class divide (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017b). Among parents with a 
bachelor’s degree or more, 88% are married. In contrast, among parents without a high school 
degree, 67% are married (see also Stykes & Williams, 2013). In addition, skipped-generation 
households tend to be more economically vulnerable than three-generational households. Over 




30% of children in skipped-generation households live in poverty compared to 17% in three-
generational households (Wu, 2018).  
White families are more likely to be in family structures associated with low poverty 
rates. In 2018, 70% of White children lived in two-parent married families compared to 36% of 
Black children, 85% of Asian children, and 61% of Hispanic children (data constraints preclude 
information for detailed Hispanic and Asian subgroups) (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018c:Table C3).  
Poverty rates for children vary as follows: 12% for non-Hispanic White, 26% for Hispanic, 12% 
for Asian, and 30% for Black children (U.S. Census Bureau, 2018d). There are exceptions to 
these general patterns. For example, some Asian groups are economically advantaged, but Asian 
children are more likely to live in three-generation households than Black and Hispanic children 
(Amorim et al., 2017; see also Pilkauskas & Cross, 2018).      
         Although cross-sectional snapshots of children’s living arrangements are useful, family 
researchers are more engaged with documenting and understanding children’s experiences as 
they unfold over time. While this has been a major research theme for more than two decades, it 
continues to be a very active area of current research. It is one thing to say that a certain 
percentage of children live in a particular family structure, but another to track their experiences 
over the course of their childhoods. This interest stems not only from the goal of demographic 
accuracy and detail, but from a large number of studies suggesting that family structure 
instability is typically not advantageous for children in the United States (e.g., Brown, 2010; 
Bzostek & Berger, 2017; Lee & McLanahan, 2015).  




  Given the trends we have reviewed here, it is unsurprising that many children experience 
a good deal of family instability. There are two concepts and measures that researchers are using 
to study these issues. Family instability generally refers to parents and children, occurring when 
a parent leaves or a new parent-figure moves in. The child may also experience other changes 
such as moving in (or out) with a grandparent or other relative, but these changes have received 
less attention overall in the instability literature. The other concept is family complexity; studies 
of family complexity are largely an achievement of the past decade (Carlson and Meyer, 2014; 
Meyer & Carlson, 2014). Typically this work focuses on complex sibling composition (half 
siblings, step-siblings) or integrates both sibling and complex-parent configurations (single-
parent, step-parent)  (Fomby, Goode, & Mollborn, 2016; Fomby & Osborne, 2017; Manning et 
al., 2014). Complexity in sibling composition is driven by multiple partner fertility in which one 
parent or step-parent has children from more than one relationship (Guzzo, 2014).  
Two recent studies examine the prevalence of family instability and/or complexity for 
children over time. Using data on children born between 1985 and 2010, Rackin and Gibson-
Davis (2018) find that family instability has plateaued for children with highly educated mothers, 
but has increased for less-advantaged children. Contrasting children’s family situations in 1996 
and 2009, another study concludes that there has been a plateau in family complexity (Manning 
et al., 2014).  
Research on family instability and complexity and their linkages to child wellbeing will 
likely to continue in the foreseeable future. One emerging direction is that researchers are 




increasingly taking account of other key social, health, and demographic concepts and measures 
when studying children’s family experiences and wellbeing. Some specific examples include a 
study of father loss and telemore length published in the journal Pediatrics by an 
interdisciplinary team including family demographers, a developmental psychologist, and a 
pediatrician who specializes in genetics and children’s health (Mitchell et al., 2017). Fowler, 
Henry, and Marcal (2015) examined both family and housing instability and their connections to 
adolescent criminal activity (see also, Bosick & Fomby, 2018; Cavanagh et al., 2018; Gaydosh & 
Harris, 2018; Mitchell et al., 2015).  Perkins (2019) provides a fresh perspective on the concept 
of instability by focusing on household instability involving non-relatives. Her work shows that 
studies on only family instability miss roughly 20% of children’s experiences of instability. 
Moreover, household instability has a negative association with children’s educational 




In 1990, Larry Bumpass asked “What’s Happening to the Family?”, concluding that families 
have undergone revolutionary changes and that these changes were unlikely to reverse 
(Bumpass, 1990). Trends in the 1970s and early 1980s certainly pointed in this direction--
declining marriage rates, increases in cohabitation and non-marital births, declining fertility, and 
large increases divorce. In contrast, Bianchi and Casper (2000) interpreted the mid- to late 1990s 




a period of “a ‘quieting’ of family change” with smaller changes in many family patterns than in 
earlier decades.  
The current decade has similarly witnessed smaller changes or stabilization in some 
trends and continuation of others, making it more difficult to provide a general characterization 
of family change over this period. With regard to marriage, trends suggesting a retreat from 
marriage appear to have continued at a generally similar pace as in previous decades. The 
average age at marriage for men and women has continued its upward trajectory and is now at 
unprecedented levels and the proportions of adults living in marital relationships has continued 
to decline while the proportion living in cohabiting relationships has increased. In addition, 
fewer cohabitors are transitioning to marriage.  
Unlike the 1970s when divorce rates increased rapidly, divorce rates have remained high 
but have declined since the early 1980s. Although a number of scholars have made this 
observation, there has been some doubt about the validity of a decline given the deteriorating 
quality of vital statistics data on divorce (Kennedy & Ruggles, 2014). New analyses using data 
from the American Community Survey, however, show a continuation of previous declines and a 
somewhat sharper drop since 2008 (Figure 2; Cohen, 2018), lending support to the decline 
interpretation. One of the main drivers of this decline has been a drop in divorce among younger 
adults, suggesting potential future declines (Cohen, 2018). In contrast, divorce among older 
Americans has increased--the “grey divorce” revolution. Also contributing to the decline in 
divorce is the aging of the married population (Kennedy & Ruggles, 2014) because despite “grey 




divorce,” older married couples remain less likely than younger couples to divorce. In addition, 
fewer couples are getting married. Thus, the married population, particularly young married 
couples, may be increasingly comprised of those who are highly committed and less likely to 
divorce. Potential selection and age composition effects are important to keep in mind when 
interpreting trends, but it is also noteworthy that when Bumpass (1990) was reflecting on basic 
demographic trends, including trends in divorce, they all pointed in the same direction. This is 
less true today.  
Fertility trends have shown more stability than change over the past decade. Since the 
large decline in fertility after the Baby Boom, fertility rates have been relatively stable. Still, the 
small drop since 2007 has brought U.S. fertility rates to record lows. Notably, although U.S. 
fertility is high relative to many developed nations, it is below replacement and moving down in 
the rankings. It appears that the Great Recession may have played a role in the recent decline 
along with declining Hispanic immigration (Cherlin et al., 2013). Although the number of U.S. 
births to foreign-born mothers declined substantially between 2007 and 2014, a large proportion 
of U.S. births occur to foreign-born women, and births to foreign-born women offset population 
decline in many areas of the U.S. (Livingston, 2016, 2017; Passel & Cohn, 2016). Whether 
fertility rates will rebound is an open question.  
We have seen striking change over the past few decades in the context in which fertility 
occurs, but this trend may be “quieting.” The percentage of births to unmarried women increased 
steadily since the 1960s but has been relatively stable since 2008 (Child Trends, 2018). This is 




also true for the share of non-marital births to cohabiting women--after increasing steadily, the 
percentage of non-marital births to cohabiting women has plateaued in the past decade at roughly 
63% (Wu, 2017). Although recent trends in non-marital fertility may have “quieted,” there is 
some evidence that instability in children’s living arrangements has continued to increase, at 
least for less economically privileged children. Multiple partner fertility has risen, and is 
common among disadvantaged women (Guzzo, 2014; Rackin & Gibson-Davis, 2018). Yet there 
is also evidence of a possible plateau in children’s experiences of family complexity (Manning et 
al., 2014). Discrepancies in findings and interpretations are sensitive to the time points being 
compared. Looking over the longer-term, and not just this past decade, children’s family 
experiences have changed dramatically. More work on family complexity is needed, especially 
studies including very recent data.  
The 2010s has also seen a growing literature on same-gender unions, the most recent 
work catalyzed by the landmark Supreme Court ruling in favor of marriage equality. 
Unsurprisingly, now that it is legal in all states, there has been an increase in same-gender 
marriage. A growing number of studies in the past decade have examined relationship quality or 
dissolution among same- and different-gender couples. To our knowledge, there is no research to 
date directly comparing dissolution chances among legally married same- and different-gender 
couples in the United States. This will be an important avenue for future research, once same-
gender marriage has been in place nationally longer. In addition, researchers should continue to 
track and update trends in the basic demographic characteristics of same-gender couples (e.g., 




Black, Gates, Sanders, & Taylor, 2000). Further, as population-representative data on gender 
identity and sexual orientation become more widely available, demographers will be better able 
to describe the families of LGBTQ persons (Baumle, 2018). Studies of transgender individuals 
have already begun to appear in demographic journals (Lagos, 2018). 
 A major theme throughout our review has been “diverging destinies” (McLanahan, 
2004). There is evidence for the continuation of this trend. The highly educated experience more 
marriage, more cohabitations that lead to marriage, less divorce, less family instability, and less 
nonmarital fertility. There are also distinct family patterns by race and ethnicity, with Whites and 
Asians experiencing less nonmarital childbearing and more marriage than Hispanics and African 
Americans. Part of these differences, as researchers have noted, stem from inequalities in 
socioeconomic status. The more privileged population subgroups, such as Whites and Asians, 
have more institutionalized family arrangements.  
In closing, we make two observations. First, one cannot understand or contextualize 
social phenomena without studying families. Whether one is interested in inequality, race-
ethnicity, emerging adulthood, mortality, dating, or immigration, families cannot be ignored. To 
take an example, as is well known, social inequality is reproduced and maintained across 
generations. Thus, family change is necessary for studying, and vital for understanding, social 
stratification and inequality (e.g., Bloome, 2017; Maralani, 2013).   
Second, the family is continually changing, as observed by many family scholars and by 
educator Ernest Groves almost a century ago, whom we quoted at the start of this review: “We 




say the home is in transition. So it is...The home problem, therefore, is not one that we can 
finally solve” (1925: pp. 228-229). Family change may be becoming even more complex in that 
trends in the recent past do not always point in the same direction or appear as uniform as in 
earlier decades.   
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FIGURE 2. REFINED DIVORCE RATE (DIVORCES PER 1,000 MARRIED WOMEN): 1890-2017. 
 
Notes: Dashed lines between years are linearly interpolated between data points. 
Sources: 1890-1920: decennial divorces per 1,000 married women aged 15+, National Center for 
Health Statistics, (1973:Table 1); 1920-1995: annual divorces per 1,000 married women aged 15+, Haines 
(2006:1-688, 1-689); 2008-2017: annual number of women aged 15+ who divorced in the previous 12 
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FIGURE 3. PERCENTAGE OF WOMEN (15-44) WHO COHABITED WITH THEIR FIRST HUSBAND, BY 




Sources: 1980-1984 Marriage Cohort: 1988 NSFG; 2010-2014 Marriage Cohort: 2011/2015 NSFG; 
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Sources: 1909-2003: National Center for Health Statistics (2003:Table 1-1); 2003-2015: Martin et al. 
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